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There Will be Doubt, But When is Doubt 
›Good‹? 
Reflections From an Old Testament Perspective
Peter Altmann
Turning to the Old Testament for perspectives on »doubt« is met 
with the absence of philological data: there is no word in bibli-
cal Hebrew that can be directly translated as »doubt«. One possible 
method for approaching this topic is to consider the appearance of 
various Greek terms in the LXX that are often translated as »doubt« 
in modern translations of the New Testament. There are several 
possibilities: diastazo: found in Mt 14,31.28,17; diakrino: Mt 21,21; 
Mk 11,23; Rm 14,23; Js 1,6; Jd 1,22; and dialogismos: Lk 24,38. The 
term diastazo does not appear in the LXX. Diakrino, when it appears, 
implies the notion of »judging«: in Ex 18,16 where the Hebrew text 
uses טפשׁ, »to judge«, and elsewhere for »discerning«, i.e., 1Kgs 3,9: 
»judging between«: ןיב. Most promising is dialogismos, which repre-
sents the Hebrew הבשׁחמ (»thoughts«, Ps 56,6, in LXX 55,6). Its us-
age in Ps 139,20 (LXX 138,20) parallels that of the New Testament 
in its negative bent. Here the term appears in the clause τι ρες ες 
διαλγισμν representing the Hebrew המזמל ךרמאי רשׁא, which can 
be rendered »those who speak of you maliciously« (NRS).
Nonetheless, it should be quite apparent that the lexical fields ren-
dered with various forms of »doubt/Zweifel« in modern translations 
for the Greek New Testament do not carry the same connotations in 
the Old Testament, even when the same terms are used in the LXX 
translations. Likewise, the term »Zweifel« does not appear in the Old 
Testament books of the German Zürcherbibel, though it does ap-
pear several times in the English NRS most strikingly in Dtn 28,66, 
where it occurs in a curse: »Your life shall hang in doubt before you; 
night and day you shall be in dread, with no assurance of your life«. 
The Hebrew term in this case is the hapax legomenon םיאלת, the root 
of which suggests »hanging«, thus with implications of terror and 
suspense.1 This lack of philological support may be the reason why 
1 In a standard Hebrew-English Lexicon, BDB, 1067, the term is understood as a 
pu‘al participle, and אלת as a bi-form of הלת, which never implies something like »ter-
ror, doubt, suspense.«
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several recent Bible dictionaries only address the NT in their entries 
on »doubt/Zweifel« if at all.2
The meager results from such a philological investigation leads 
to the search for other means of entry into the thematic of »doubt« 
in the Old Testament. A second possible approach is to begin with 
modern definitions, and then proceed by way of thematic resem-
blances. Consideration of the etymological meanings of the modern 
German word »Zweifel« or the English »doubt« and French »doute« 
(from Latin Dubitare) present a very different situation. Zweifel, as is 
easily seen, derives from the notion of »doppelt, gespalten, zweifach, 
zwiefältig.« An English dictionary, Merrian Websters, proposes for the 
noun »doubt« the following: 
»an uncertainty of belief or opinion that often interferes with 
decision-making b: a deliberate suspension of judgment 2: a state 
of affairs giving rise to uncertainty, hesitation, or suspense 3a: a 
lack of confidence: distrust b: an inclination not to believe or 
accept.«
At the base of both the Germanic and the Latin-based expressions 
is an uncertainty, often one that leads to an inability to act. One can 
conclude from the German root that the availability of more than 
one option leads to a point of decision between them, giving rise 
to the possibility of indecision. Doubt defined this way is more or 
less a human given: life presents everyone with many conflicting or 
dissonant experiences and objects – each person orders this diversity 
according to both subtly and drastically different principles. Yet, as 
Kierkegaard noted in his statement, »Doubt comes into the world 
through faith«3 one must have some belief in order for doubt to 
develop: without a basic orientation of trust, no doubt can develop.
2 M. Beiner, Art. Zweifel, I. Systematisch-theologisch, TRE 36:767-772 does not 
discuss the biblical data. In fact, when looking for an entry on doubt in modern ref-
erence works, RGG and ABD provide no entry at all, while in NIBD (2:160), S.-K. 
Wan provides a very short discussion solely of New Testament material.
3 S. Kierkegaard, Journals and Papers, transl. by H.V. and E.H. Hong, Bloomington 
/Indianapolis, 1976, 1:399 (IV B 13:18,19). J.K.A. Smith (The Devil Reads Derrida 
and Other Essays on the University, the Church, Politics, and the Arts, Grand Rapids, 
Michigan, 2009, 14) comments on Kierkegaard’s view as follows, »Doubt is not the 
antithesis or antidote to faith; it is its companion in a way. We might simply put it this 
way: Only believers can doubt. And in some cases, doubt is faithful precisely where cer-
tainty is unfaithful. Some of our doubts – like Thomas’s – grow out of our believing 
the promises of a good and loving God. The lament psalms (e.g., Psalm 77) articulate 
just this kind of strange paradox: that it is sometimes more faithful to doubt precisely 
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The only monograph to my knowledge on doubt in the Old 
Testament seems to take something similar as its starting point. 
Davidson’s The Courage to Doubt begins from the paradox of God’s 
self revelation to the world on one hand contrasted with God’s hid-
denness on the other, and studies how these two poles are held to-
gether in Old Testament spirituality.4 Unfortunately, Davidson never 
actually provides a definition for doubt, nor a matrix for recognizing 
occurrences of doubt in the Old Testament. 
In light of the gap in scholarship with regard to a methodology 
for addressing doubt in the Old Testament, I will turn to what I see 
as a one important aspect: the »problem« of universal and everyday 
human doubt within the juxtaposition of doubt with trust or con-
fidence.5
A thematic survey of the possible appearances of doubt yields 
numerous results across the various genres of the Old Testament – in 
narratives, wisdom literature, and prophetic literature. For example, 
Sarah doubts that she will really bear a child (Gen 16.18). In 1 Kings 
22 (cf. 1 Kgs 13) opposing prophetic oracles from Yahweh are pre-
sented. Job – both in the narrative frame and in the dialogues – ad-
dresses the issue. In Genesis 3 the serpent doubts the divine word 
and invites the humans to share its view. Jeremiah (20,7-18) can 
be said to shape his doubt in the form of protest, much like the 
many lament Psalms (i.e., Pss 44.60.74.79.80.84.85.88.90.123.137). 
These various texts can perhaps best be divided into the following 
categories: (1) doubt that remains within or a part of a relationship 
of trust in God, i.e., Job; (2) doubt that questions a trust in God, i.e., 
1 Kings 22; and (3) doubt as blatant mistrust, i.e., Genesis 3. Naming 
three categories allows doubt to be valued both as positive and nega-
tive, but it is nonetheless not always clear that all Old Testament texts 
have these categories in mind: the systemization is certainly my own. 
Given this range of categories, doubt, in and of itself, is therefore 
value neutral. 
when it seems like God’s goodness has been eclipsed by the tragic. It’s not that we 
won’t believe, but we can’t believe.«
4 R. Davidson, The Courage to Doubt: Exploring an Old Testament Theme, London 
/Philadelphia, 1983, esp. x–xi.
5 A further use of the concept of doubt in modern thought is the philosophical 
method most often associated with Descartes, which attempts to determine an un-
questionable epistemological foundation from which an ensuing philosophical struc-
ture can be constructed. This methodological doubt will not be the topic of my 
reflections, as it is unknown in the Old Testament (the method of reflection in Ec-
clesiastes could be a possible exception, though I would contend otherwise).
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The diversity of these texts gives rise, however, to the question of 
what the distinguishing features of occurrences of doubt might be? 
One might further question what it is that differentiates doubt from 
unbelief, or doubt from protest? Unbelief seems to be what a number 
of New Testament texts have in mind when they condemn what 
is often translated as doubt: i.e., Matt 14,31 (to Peter), »O you of 
little faith, why did you doubt (diastazo)?« or James 1,6, »ask in faith 
without any doubting (diakrino), for the one who doubts is like the 
surf of the sea driven and tossed by the wind.« Such dynamics also 
occur in the Old Testament, for example in Exod 16,20 a number of 
Israelites disregard (literally »do not listen«: ועמשיׁ לא) Moses’ com-
mand to gather only manna for one day. Those texts in which doubt 
takes on the connotations of unbelief fall within my third category.
Yet the Old Testament, also addresses doubt within the context of 
faith: it is often the believing who doubt, and there are many cases 
where they are not reproved for their questioning. More often they 
express their doubts in various forms of protest, thus making it quite 
difficult to distinguish between protest and doubt. Maybe, then, it is 
best to see protest as one of a number of possible expressions of 
doubt.6 In recent scholarship this protest has taken on an important 
role in the formation of Old Testament theologies, especially in that 
of Walter Brueggemann’s Theology of the Old Testament,7 which places 
it as a counterpoint, under the title »counter-testimony« to the 
prominent »core-testimony«, which is the basic salvation-historical 
storyline. The psalms of lament and Jeremiah’s confessions are well-
known examples of this doubt expressed in protest. 
Nonetheless, doubt may express itself otherwise as well, in such 
actions as mourning or laughter. Generally speaking, however, doubt 
in the Old Testament, in all its forms is, as von Rad comments, 
»not doubt about the existence of Jahweh […] but doubt about 
his readiness to interfere drastically in history or in the life of the 
individual«.8 This interpretation encompasses far more than simply 
protest, mistrust, or weak belief. Rather, protest is one of a number 
of responses growing out of doubt. In what follows I will investigate 
several expressions of doubt that show its presence is far broader 
than simply protest: but also of sadness as in Lam 5,19-22, and laugh-
ter in Genesis 17-18. As to why I have chosen these texts, in brief, 
Lamentations even through its very genre as lyric poetry and both 
6 This appears to be Davidson’s understanding.
7 W. Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, Minneapolis 1997.
8 Old Testament Theology, 1962, 1:453.
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the Genesis texts in their focus on laughter and Lamentations with 
its sadness put the emotions of doubt on display. 
Doubt and Mourning: Lamentations 5,19-22
Lamentations 5: One of the most touching mentions of doubt ap-
pears at the end of Lamentations, a book of five poems reflecting on 
the destruction of Jerusalem and Judah by the Babylonians in 587/6 
b.c.e. and the fact that the city remained in ruins. As Dobbs-Allsopp 
notes, it is significant that the biblical book eschews the divine voice, 
unlike its Mesopotamian counterparts, such as »The Lamentation 
over the Destruction of Sumer and Ur«, in which the responsible 
deity declares that the period of suffering has come to an end.9 The 
final poem begins: »Remember, O Yahweh, what has happened to 
us! Gaze and see our shame« (5,1). The chapter provides numerous 
details on the destruction: children became orphans, and people had 
to purchase even the essentials because they had no property of their 
own. These circumstances are what lead up to the book’s conclusion: 
(VV. 19-22)
»You, Yahweh, will be enthroned forever;  
Your throne from generation to generation.  
Why, will you forget us forever? 
Will you abandon us for the duration of days?  
Bring us back, o Yahweh, to you, and we will return,  
renew our days like earlier. 
But certainly you have completely rejected us,  
You have raged against us abundantly.«
This strophe begins with a trope well known from elsewhere (Pss 
10,14-16; 80,1-3), where it is an utterance of praise. In this context it 
instead forms the basis for the ensuing doubt, rather than confidence: 
»If it is true that God reigns forever, then why does the situation 
continue to remain so tragic?« Following von Rad’s formulation, 
God’s lack of readiness to interfere in human history in the specific 
case of Jerusalem’s demise is lamented, so, then, what can one expect 
of the future? These first three verses (19-21) describe the oscilla-
tion from the statement of Yahweh’s unbounded kingship, to the 
uneasiness about the future in light of the current abandonment, 
and finally to the prayer for restoration. To this point the structure 
follows a general pattern of laments. This contrast between prior 
9 F.W. Dobbs-Allsopp, Lamentations, Interpretation, 2002, 150.
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divine presence and promise on the one hand and the physical suf-
fering of Jerusalem’s desolation on the other hand leads to the hard 
to interpret conclusion of the book in V. 22. The LUT (similar are 
ZUR, NRS, and NAS) translates a hesitant: 
»Hast du uns denn ganz verworfen, und bist du allzu sehr über 
uns erzürnt?«
On this reading there is no assurance of divine action, but merely a 
question. What is one to expect for the future? Perhaps Yahweh has 
forgotten them for the rest of time? However, this reading leaves far 
more space for the possibility of divine action than that of several 
recent interpreters who suggest the following interpretation: 
»But instead you have completely rejected us; you have been very 
angry with us.«10
 This difference in this interpretation (which matches with my trans-
lation above) lies in a different understanding of the first two words 
of the verse םא יכ. The problem with the translation as a question 
found, i.e., in LUT, is that the Hebrew double conjunction is not 
typically used to introduce a question. A further possibility is that the 
verse is an extension of V. 21, therefore reading: »Renew our days 
like earlier, unless you have completely abandoned us«. 
Regardless of which reading one opts for – and perhaps some level 
of ambiguity could be intentional – it remains difficult to find hints 
of protest in these verses. The eternal nature of the divine throne (V. 
19) is simply contrasted with the rejected state of Jerusalem and Judah. 
The tone is instead pleading: »Bring us back, O Yahweh«. Either this 
prayer is juxtaposed directly with an observation of Yahweh’s rejec-
tion, or the prayer is restricted by the statement of Yahweh’s rejec-
tion and anger. In both cases the presentation of mutually exclusive 
alternatives at the end of the book comments on the tragedy, the 
sadness that is the final doubt that the book left with the audience.
The absence of the divine voice in the book as a whole (as men-
tioned above) along with the accepted canonical status of the book 
suggest that its perspective has theological approval: faith leads to 
doubt. Past experience and present emptiness form a cacophonic 
10 D.R. Hillers, Lamentations, rev. ed.; AB 7A, New York, 1992, 156, 160–161; A. Ber-
lin, Lamentations, OTL, Louisville, 2002, 115, 125–126. The JPS translation follows 
this reading of V. 22: »For truly, You have rejected us; Bitterly raged against us.« This 
translation, in keeping with the rabbinic traditions supporting it then repeats V. 21 in 
order to provide the book with something of a final denouement, as it also does for 
the conclusions of Isaiah, Malachi, and Qoheleth.
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dissonance. The book itself underlines the possibility and indeed 
importance for sorrowful lament and deep reflection on previous 
theological propositions. In these particular verses, the theologi-
cal question relates (as it does in many places in Lamentations) to 
the inviolability of Jerusalem: must Yahweh protect Jerusalem from 
foreign attack as the God of Jerusalem? This Zion theology, as it is 
commonly known, is called into question by the insistence on God’s 
eternal throne (Yahweh remains God) along with the hesitancy of 
Yahweh’s commitment to restoring Jerusalem. As a result, sadness in 
the face of tragedy is accepted as a biblically sanctioned expression 
of doubt. Here, »Lament allows the real experience of suffering in 
pain, confusion, doubt, and alienation to surface in the context of 
faith; in other words, ›a proclamation truly revealing things for what 
they are‹«.11
Doubt and Laughter: Genesis 17 and 18
Genesis 17 and 18 offer alternative aetiologies for the name of the 
future son, Isaac – Hebrew קחצי, »He laughs« – that are directly re-
lated to their response to the combination of God’s pronouncement 
that they will have a son and their physical state. The two narratives 
can be understood within their historical-literary contexts as parts 
of different sources: Genesis 17 is an integral part of the Priestly 
source, while Genesis 18 comes from an earlier complex that clas-
sical scholarship sees as part of the Yahwistic (J) source, while others 
(those doubting the existence of such a J source) often attribute it to 
an Abraham-Lot cycle consisting of Genesis 13,18-19.12 Both nar-
ratives share the thematic of promise-doubt and laughter because of 
the present circumstances-reassurance. Both narratives also refer to 
a certain element of inner dialogue: »Abraham laughed and said to 
himself«; »Sarah laughed to herself, saying«. Nonetheless, each nar-
rative places different accents with regard to their presentation and 
perspective on doubt.
11 A.M. McCoy, Faith at the Fractures of Life: an Examination of Lament and Praise 
in Response to Human Suffering with Special Reference to the Theology of Walter 
Brueggemann and David Ford, University of St. Andrews, 2009, 196.
12 For a formulation of the classical perspective see C. Westermann, Genesis 12–36, 
BKAT 1/2, Neukirchen-Vluyn, 1981; for rejection of the J hypothesis with regard to 
Genesis 18, see E. Blum, Die Komposition der Vätergeschichte, WMANT 57, Neu-
kirchen-Vluyn, 1984.
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Abraham’s Laughter: Genesis 17
Genesis 17 as a whole is comprised almost completely of divine 
speech. The chapter begins with God proclaiming an eternal cov-
enant with Abraham that guarantees him land and a hoard of nations. 
God changes his name from Abram in the process and pronounces 
circumcision as the ongoing sign of this bond. In 17,15 God then 
focuses on Sarai. The first divine action is to change her name to 
Sarah, thereby matching the action taken with regard to Abraham. 
While Abraham receives the covenant, Genesis 17 does not grant 
him any direct blessing. This blessing is reserved for Sarah in V. 16, 
first in the form of a single son, and then in the form of nations 
– specifically kings of peoples (God also pronounces blessing on 
Ishmael at Abraham’s request, V. 20).
It is directly in response to God’s proclamation of blessing in the 
form of a son from Sarah by Abraham that the patriarch expresses 
his doubt. 
»Then Abraham fell upon his face, and he laughed. And he said 
to himself, ›Will to a hundred year old man be born, and Sarah? 
– will she bear as a ninety year old woman?‹ Then Abraham said 
to God, ›If only Ishmael might live in your presence!‹« (Gen 
17,17-18)
Surprisingly, this is Abraham’s first verbal response to the promise 
of an eternal covenant including offspring and land in the chapter. 
God has spoken for the previous 16 verses; space is only allowed for 
Abraham to fall on his face (V. 3), a clear sign of humility and wor-
ship, which is repeated in V. 17 (the repetition, along with the repeti-
tions of God speaking might point to layers of redaction within the 
chapter, though interpreters are divided on this point). Thus homage 
sets the initial context for the – then perhaps somewhat surprising – 
initially internal expression of doubt.
The narrator is omniscient in V. 17, whether or not God knows of 
Abraham’s internal dialogue does not play a role in the later verses. 
It is, nonetheless, in Abraham’s inner dialogue, thus demonstrating 
the importance of interiority for the story, that the doubt occurs. 
Without the report of Abraham’s inner thoughts, it might still have 
been possible to interpret Abraham’s answer in V. 18 as stemming 
from a lack of confidence in the divine promise, though it could 
also be seen as (solely) concern for his eldest son, Ishmael. With the 
mention of Abraham’s questioning the possibility for him at one 
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hundred and Sarah at ninety to have a child, an existential situation 
that would be termed »doubt« in the modern world arises.
God quickly moves to reaffirm emphatically the promise con-
cerning Sarah (»However, Sarah your wife is about to bear you a 
son, and you shall name him Isaac«). The use of the emphatic term 
לבא (»However«) and also the reaffirmation of »Sarah, your wife«, so 
that there can be no mistaking the maternity of the promised son, 
both underline God’s attempt to reassure, or possibly to neutral-
ize Abraham’s doubts. It is only after this that attention is turned 
to Ishmael – the one whom Abraham mentions aloud – who also 
receives a rich blessing (V. 20). Then God returns to the problematic 
of Sarah’s future progeny, remarking that his birth will take place 
in a year’s time, and the covenant will be established through him 
(V. 21). This marks the end of God’s interaction with Abraham, and 
upon reaffirming the covenant through Isaac, God goes up from 
Abraham.
Within the story, Abraham’s laughter and plea for blessing for 
Ishmael display an inner dissonance that can be taken as the dis-
ruption of a monolithic reality. The contrast between God’s spoken 
promise and Abraham’s practical reality exert profound pressure on 
the human subject. How will he choose to live in the light of such 
opposing propositions? Abraham chooses laughter, a construct not 
without a history of its own in modern discourse.
From a philosophical perspective John Caputo suggests, 
»Nothing undoes the metaphysics of presence better than laugh-
ter. Nothing is more unsettling than laughter. Nothing heals 
like laughter. Nothing keeps us open like laughter. […] It is the 
power to laugh at oneself, one’s fears, one’s beliefs that liberates 
and keeps the flux in play, keeps us in movement with the flux, 
and keeps the openness to the mystery from becoming nostalgia 
and melancholy, malingering and moping. […] Laughter enno-
bles, strengthens, sees one through a bad time.«13
Caputo’s comments are in critique of Martin Heidegger’s attempt 
to ground meaning in some kind of artistic or poetic presence, 
Heidegger’s unrelenting (and ever more esoteric) grasping for the 
answer to humanity’s lack of a knowable foundation for meaning 
in the present world. Caputo instead turns to Kierkegaard and 
Nietzsche, two thinkers much more willing to live outside the secu-
rity of foundationalism. The advantage of the approach taken here 
by Caputo, as I see it, is that it allows humanity to look the trag-
13 J. Caputo, Radical Hermeneutics, Bloomington/Indianapolis, 1987, 292–93.
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edies of life full in the face, pick up the pieces, and continue living. 
This approach provides insight into Abraham’s laughter: the ongo-
ing tragedy of childlessness removed the possibility of a grounded 
foundation of meaning for Abraham within the world as it appeared. 
Ishmael’s birth, however, then allowed him a concrete way forward 
towards reconciling the world as Abraham experienced it with the 
divine promise. The divine in-breaking of Genesis 17 does not allow 
such an easy conclusion. Yet unlike Caputo’s perspective, laughter in 
Genesis 17 does not come as some kind of (Camus-like?) existential 
response to unaccountable suffering and tragedy – if Nietzschian 
then mocking the tragedy – but rather in response to a situation that 
already seems to have overcome the worst through human creativ-
ity (a surrogate child through Hagar). What is so striking in this 
story is that the divine promise, coming after Ishmael’s birth, does 
the unsettling. The humans had found a way out of the agoniz-
ing despair of childlessness! Yet in keeping with Caputo’s analysis, 
it is laughter that acknowledges the presence of two realities, it is 
laughter that expresses the presence of doubt. This laughter – like 
Caputo’s – marks openness, rather than a monolithic monologue of 
either God’s promise or Abraham’s experience, thereby creating the 
possibility for their intermingling that can then lead to a new and 
unexpected reality.
Sarah Laughs (Last): Genesis 18,9–15
Genesis 18 takes place at »the oaks of Mamre,« when Abraham 
showers Yahweh, in the form of three travellers, with rich hospi-
tality.14 Abraham’s generous meal for the surprise travellers provides 
the important background setting for the subsequent interactions, in 
which the contrast between Sarah’s »doubt« and laughter in response 
to God’s promise (VV. 8–15) and Abraham’s »doubt« or questioning 
of God’s planned destruction of Sodom (VV. 16–33) can be both 
confusing and instructive. Taken together these two separate narra-
tives can be seen as an extended reflection on the limits, difficulties, 
and benefits of doubt. Given that the protest elements of VV. 16–33 
have been addressed elsewhere, they will not be dealt with here.15 
14 It is unclear how exactly one should reconcile V.1: »Yahweh appeared to him«, 
with V.2: »And there were three men standing opposite him«. As most commentators 
remark, there is no need to get caught up in this discrepancy by proposing some kind 
of »pre-Yahwistic« polytheistic layer or the like.
15  Davidson, Courage to Doubt, 44–48.
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With regard to the previous narrative of Genesis 17, I find it most 
helpful to read the two chapters as reflecting on various stories of 
the same promise, and they are not necessarily meant to be read 
chronologically, though this can easily be done without harm. 
Reading chronologically, however, requires that one comes to some 
conclusion about Sarah’s lack of knowledge about God’s promise 
of a child through her in Genesis 17. Many interpreters that go this 
route assume that Abraham kept that experience to himself (per-
haps a further expression of doubt). I will treat the narrative of Gen 
18,1-15 without suggesting that observations from ch. 17 can be 
understood as known to the authors of Genesis 18.
The description of the rich feast in 18,1-8 portrays Abraham as an 
able and caring host for all visitors: the fact that Yahweh is present in 
the three travelers is known to the audience through the narrator’s 
remark in V. 1, but this remains unspoken to Abraham. This initial 
scene ends with the statement that Abraham stood by them under 
the tree and they ate (V. 8).
The next scene begins with the unexpected question as to the 
whereabouts of Sarah, »your wife« (V. 9). Sarah had received brief 
mention in V. 6 as bread maker in the tent (showing that the nar-
rator and Abraham know where she is), but she is otherwise absent 
from the feast. Abraham answers the visitors, making known her 
presence in the tent – at a distance from the feast;16 these are his 
last words in the scene. The divine response is emphatic (V. 10): »I 
will surely return (infinitive absolute + finite verb) to you at ›the 
time of life-giving‹ (in nine months), and surely there will be a son 
for Sarah your wife!« There is no introduction or build up to this 
pronouncement: it appears unexpectedly. The focus of the action 
changes settings, from the tree of feasting to the tent of bread mak-
ing, where Sarah is listening at the entrance. The change in scenery 
is important because it is only at this point that Sarah – alone at the 
entrance to the tent (which is behind Abraham) – actively takes the 
stage as more than a part of Abraham’s entourage, while Abraham 
himself recedes into the background.
Yet the narrator jumps in and provides a further comment, not only 
on the change of scenery, but also in order to provide background 
so that the audience can grasp the nature of the guest’s (or guests’, 
depending on one’s text-critical analysis of VV. 9-10) pronounce-
ment. The audience is told or reminded – depending on whether 
one is aware of Gen 17,17 or not – that both Abraham and Sarah 
16 J.-L. Ska, The Exegesis of the Pentateuch: Exegetical Studies and Basic Questions, 
FAT 66; Tübingen, 2009.
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are old. This version of the information on their age includes details 
only hinted at in Genesis 17: Sarah has gone through menopause. 
The version in Genesis 17 leaves the details hidden, with both par-
ties no longer able to produce children. Here the woman’s status is 
singled out.
The surprising nature of the promise in the context of especially 
Sarah’s physical state makes her response quite understandable: (V. 12) 
she laughs to herself, literally »in her insides.« The unique choice of 
laughing together with this phrase ironically plays off the mention 
of the ceasing of Sarah’s »womanly way« (a literal translation) in V. 11, 
and her own inner question: »[Now,] after I am withered, will this 
pleasure come to me – and my husband [too] is old!« It seems ap-
propriate, given Ishmael’s absence from the narrative, to assume that 
the role of the surrogate son is not in view, but rather a different set 
of factors.17 Sarah lays down the bare facts of her physical experi-
ence: she has no menstrual cycle; she is worn out (הלב). The image 
is poignant, used elsewhere in the Old Testament for clothing. Her 
womanhood, if linked as one can assume for the culture and time 
period directly to her ability to bear children, is limited by wear 
and tear, and the material only holds out for so long. Sarah’s dif-
ficulty reconciling the exuberant promise with her heretofore dreary 
physical reality leads her to laughter. Her laughter can be taken as 
something more visceral perhaps than Abraham’s in the previous 
chapter. She laughs »in her insides«, while in Genesis 17 he laughs 
openly. Her lack of a menstrual cycle finds its way into the text as a 
bodily laugh.
Yet there are no words interrupting the visitor’s promise in V. 10 
and his question or rebuke of Sarah’s laugh to Abraham in V. 13. The 
narrator reports Sarah’s inner dialogue, but no record of Abraham’s 
thoughts is provided. Why the shift to the woman? Is Sarah the ci-
pher for them both (perhaps also the case in deuterocanonical Tobit 
10,4-5), thus mirroring Abraham’s laughter in Genesis 17? 
At this point (V. 13) the text makes clear (finally) that Yahweh is 
the one speaking to her – whether Abraham and Sarah are aware of 
their interlocutor’s identity is unstated, though at some point it must 
become known to them. This also stands in contrast to the narra-
tive in Genesis 17, where there was no question that it was a divine 
promise of blessing and fertility. On the part of Abraham and Sarah 
17 One may again – if Gen 16 and the birth of Ishmael may be taken into consid-
eration – posit Sarah’s attempt to rely on Hagar as a surrogate mother as a proposed 
solution to the dissonance between the divine promise and the heretofore lack of 
progeny. 
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in Genesis 18, perhaps this must be intuited, though it seems only 
to be emerging at this point: who other than a divine being would 
be able to pronounce such promises? Perhaps her question points 
to Sarah’s lack of recognition of the visitor’s divinity? How was she 
to know that he was Yahweh? Why should she take his words as a 
trustworthy telling of the future?
Yahweh states, »Why this? Sarah laughed saying: Will even truly I 
bear [a son]? But I am old! Is anything too hard for Yahweh? I will 
return to you at the time of life, and for Sarah there will be a son.«18 
Several aspects of this divine word are important for an analysis of 
Sarah’s doubt. First, Yahweh seizes upon Sarah’s doubts in his use 
of two emphatics (ףא, םנמא), neither of which Sarah herself used in 
her inner dialogue reported in the previous verses. These emphatic 
words underline her lack of confidence in her own ability to bear a 
child. Second, the text is unclear as to where Yahweh’s quotation of 
Sarah’s words actually ends. Modern translations end the quotation 
after the statement »But I am old!« However, it is quite possible that 
the following statement: »Is anything too hard for Yahweh?« (this 
statement could also be read as an exclamation, rather than a ques-
tion) also belongs to Sarah’s inner dialogue. Attributing this clause 
to Sarah might be more plausible because otherwise Yahweh uses 
a third person designation (his own name) to refer to himself. This 
reading would mean that Yahweh attributes a profound trust, if an 
exclamation, on Sarah’s behalf in Yahweh’s ability to reach into her 
physical reality and change it. The two possible readings of this state-
ment allow the audience to read in their own expectations. Perhaps 
it is best to ask: is it Sarah who doubts, or rather the reader who 
doubts? The positive connotations of her laughter agree with her 
own joyful statement later when Isaac is born, in 21,6 »Sarah said, 
›God has made me laugh‹«.
The problem with this interpretation comes with Sarah’s response 
when her laughing – her doubt – has been outed. She appears to 
choose shame by attempting to hid her laughter: »Sarah lied saying, 
›I did not laugh.‹« The narrator comments that her lie was birthed in 
fear. One may also ask here whether the narrator provides an excuse 
that makes her laughter acceptable: i.e., it is O.K. to lie about laugh-
ing if the reason for the lie is fear.19 Or, on the other hand, does the 
18 It is striking that Yahweh does not speak directly to Sarah, but instead to Abraham 
about the reason for Sarah’s laughter. Abraham never answers. 
19 I.e., G.J. Wenham, Genesis, WBC, Waco, TX, 1987, 48: »These remarks of Sarah’s 
show us the basis of her doubts. She laughed not out of cocky arrogance but because 
a life of long disappointment had taught her not to clutch at straws. Hopelessness, not 
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author’s statement show what was wrong with Sarah’s motivation for 
lying: there was nothing wrong with her laugh, so she did not need 
to lie and cover it up.
This further question about the reason for the laughter is a deci-
sive difference between the reports of laughter in the two chapters: 
God simply leaves when finished stating the promises in Gen 17,22, 
but in Genesis 18 the reason for the laughter is sought. The reader 
of Genesis 17 is therefore left to fill in a much greater void with 
regard to Abraham’s laughter. Neither Sarah nor Abraham is willing 
to answer God on the reason for Sarah’s laughter in Genesis 18, but 
here the question is at least asked, and the text portrays a profound 
avoidance of the question in Sarah’s lie.
Neither is her lie allowed to remain hidden. With an abrupt end-
ing to the discussion, Yahweh simply answers »No, but you did lie«. 
The tension remains palatable, but the narrative moves on. What is 
the audience to do with Sarah? From a modern reader’s perspective 
Sarah does not fare well when she is thrust into the public eye: in 
both Gen 12,10–20 and later in Genesis 20, public viewing of Sarah 
lands her in the harem of various rulers. She generally finds safety 
when hidden among the tents. Yet not even this physical seclusion 
can protect her in this chapter, for the visitor(s) knows of her pres-
ence, who inquires of her whereabouts. She must play a vital role 
in the story.
Conclusion
Do Sarah, Abraham, and Lamentations fit the role of the »unbeliev-
er«? Such a determination fits closer with some biblical definitions 
of doubt, which contrast it with single-minded belief. Yet this does 
not necessarily fit these examples. One might certainly imagine that 
Sarah – and Abraham – were puzzled at best with God’s method for 
keeping promises, though they are portrayed as resilient if imperfect 
followers of their God. As such they may perhaps instead provide 
a complimentary image to that of some »unbelieving« or »little-
faithed« doubter.20 The situation in the New Testament is also more 
pride, underlays her unbelief. Her self-restraint in not openly expressing her doubts 
and the sadness behind them go far to explain the gentleness of the divine rebuke.«
20 This approach is taken by W. Brueggemann, Genesis, Interpretation, Atlanta 1982, 
158: »The entire text of Gen. 17 concerns binding Abraham to God in radical faith. Yet 
by verses 17-18, Abraham completely doubts the promise, laughs a mocking laugh, 
and appeals to the son already at hand. Abraham, the father of faith, is here again pre-
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complex, of course, as can be seen in the portrayal of »doubting« 
Thomas (John 20,24–29): his unbelief does not seem to be rejected 
as a wrong human choice, but rather the consequence of human 
existence. Doubt in the sense described in Lam 5,19–22; Gen 17.18 
is an acceptable – according to the Old Testament texts in which it is 
found – response from genuine Yahweh-followers to either a tragic 
situation such as the destruction of Jerusalem or the long, wearying 
unfulfilled desire for a child. For how is a believer to respond to 
the stark contrast between Yahweh’s specific promises of care for 
his followers’ present and future on the one hand and the ongoing 
absence of this very care? To bring Caputo’s perspective back into 
view, the laughter – as well as sadness – calls this particular kind of 
a monolithic »metaphysics of [divine] presence,« the unquestion-
able divine promises, into question by pointing to the facts on the 
ground, where the fulfillment of the promises are absent. 
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sented as the unfaithful one, unable to trust, and willing to rely on an alternative to 
the promise«. He also compares them to the unbelieving disciples in Mark 8,14–21.
